

**EXTRAC**

AHEAD OF THE THREAT

## Weekly MONITOR

### Russia

3 Feb 26

Reporting Period: 1001Z 26 Jan 26 to 1000Z 2 Feb 26

ID: 26/075

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## BLUF

From 26 Jan 26 to 2 Feb 26, **Russian officials and Kremlin-aligned sources framed NATO as preparing for inevitable war with Russia, citing alliance enlargement, Arctic militarisation, exercises, and tanker inspections as evidence of rehearsed confrontation.**

Russian sources **framed the Abu Dhabi talks between Moscow and Kyiv, scheduled for 4 to 5 Feb 26, as opaque but ongoing, while portraying the 'energy truce' between the two states as a tactical pause in strikes on related infrastructure.**

It is **likely\*** **Russian narratives will frame negotiations as good-faith Russian efforts obstructed by the West, rather than compromise-driven diplomacy.** They will also highly likely recast NATO as rehearsing warfighting, casting the West as obstructing Russian good-faith negotiations.

It is **highly likely that Kremlin-aligned commentators expect continued fighting despite the 'energy truce,'** and will treat absent battlefield gains as failures or missed opportunities, not restraint.

**Moldovan sources reported a large-scale Russian disinformation campaign portraying the country as unstable and Western-controlled.** Kremlin-aligned channels dismissed Estonian warnings that Russian combat veterans entering Schengen pose security risks, redirecting the narrative onto Ukraine veterans in Europe.

It is likely that Kremlin-aligned messaging will **reframe Baltic maritime enforcement by NATO and the aforementioned veteran-screening measures as hybrid aggression** to legitimise escalation rhetoric in the Baltic Sea.

\*Probabilistic language adheres to the PHIA Yardstick.

## 1 | Russia on NATO

**Russian official discussions about NATO** continued to depict the organisation as structurally oriented towards confrontation with Russia. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko stated that NATO's main 'policy vector' is an 'inevitable clash' with Moscow.<sup>[1]</sup> This includes NATO 'militarising' the Arctic, while Russia supports the Arctic Council's policy of 'no escalation.'<sup>[2]</sup> He also claimed that the EU sees Russia as a 'long-term threat' even after a potential 'Ukrainian [war] settlement.'<sup>[3]</sup>

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, meanwhile, stated the war in Ukraine was a proxy for 'the West vs. Russia,' caused by NATO expansion and Western 'involvement' after the 2013 Euromaidan unrest in Ukraine.<sup>[4][5]</sup>

Other Russian diplomatic lines promoted a new international security order. A spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department of European Problems reiterated the importance of a Eurasian security architecture to 'stabilise' the military-political situation on the continent.<sup>[6]</sup> The permanent Russian representative at the OSCE said the organisation should 'integrate' into such efforts.<sup>[7]</sup>

**Regarding NATO exercises and operations,** analysis by Kremlin-aligned pro-war blogger Two Majors framed Ex STEADFAST DART 2026 as preparation for war on Russia's borders by rehearsing west-to-east force movement via Rota, Kiel, and Emden, making Germany a 'trans-shipment hub' supplying the Baltics, Poland, and Romania.<sup>[8]</sup> They argued that the focus on states bordering Russia and Belarus suggests confidence in repelling a Russian attack or preparations for 'an offensive operation.'<sup>[9]</sup>

The post was also translated and shared by sources within the Kremlin-aligned InfoDefense propaganda network.<sup>[10]</sup>

Similarly, a separate Kremlin-aligned source cited warnings by German Lieutenant General Gerald Funke that a Russian attack on NATO could occur within 'two to three years.'<sup>[11]</sup> It cited Germany's 45th Armoured Brigade in Lithuania and rapid reinforcement plans as evidence of 'bracing for war.'<sup>[12]</sup>

**Russian sources framed NATO enlargement** as inherently escalatory following Finland and Sweden's accession. Grushko claimed the two states 'immediately became militant' and were 'ready to sacrifice everything to remain under the US military umbrella.'<sup>[13]</sup> Other commentary cast Finland as being a forward NATO base and preparing strikes on Moscow under the guise of 'defensive measures.'<sup>[14]</sup>

Kremlin-aligned sources portrayed Finnish-led 'critical underwater infrastructure' monitoring, alongside Estonia, as surveillance of civilian shipping targeting Russian tankers under the pretext of them belonging to the 'shadow fleet.'<sup>[15][16]</sup> They also cited NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence advice for Nordic and Baltic states to develop coordinated 'offensive' military and information operations with NATO.<sup>[17][18]</sup>

Similar Russian sources framed NATO enlargement as enabling 'aggressive' intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) of Russia, using open-source monitoring of P-8A Poseidon and RC-135W Rivet Joint flights near Sevastopol, Feodosia, the Crimean Bridge, and Novorossiysk to warn of 'provocations.'<sup>[19][20]</sup>

**More broadly,** Kremlin-aligned sources claimed Russia's Maritime Council was preparing to present proposals to President Vladimir Putin 'in the near future' for Navy escorts to protect oil tankers against NATO inspections.<sup>[21][22]</sup>

## 2 | Russia and Ukraine

Russian sources portrayed peace talks in Abu Dhabi as functional yet opaque. On 2 Feb 26, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed delegations from Russia, Ukraine, and the US would hold the second round of negotiations there on 4 and 5 Feb 26, stating that negotiations are 'very complex.'<sup>[23][24]</sup> He said Russian delegates receive regular instructions directly from President Putin and warned that public discussion 'would only harm' talks.<sup>[25]</sup>

Peskov reiterated that Russia's 'basic conditions' – namely on territory in Donbas – were 'clearly set out' in the 'Anchorage formula,' supposedly agreed with the US in Alaska on 15 Aug 25.<sup>[26]</sup> Despite this, Foreign Minister Lavrov said Russia 'does not know' what security guarantees the US and Ukraine discussed, adding Moscow had already agreed security guarantees with Washington during 2022 talks in Istanbul.<sup>[27]</sup>

The reported 'energy truce,' halting Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure in return for Ukrainian restraint against Russian oil assets, featured prominently and was described by Kremlin-aligned sources as a limited pause designed to test command and control and signalling rather than de-escalation.<sup>[28][29]</sup> They highlighted that neither Moscow nor Kyiv issued formal public confirmation, creating confusion over the scope and duration of the pause.<sup>[30][31][32]</sup>

Two narratives emerged around the pause in Russian messaging. The first framed it as a gesture to create a 'favourable background' for the upcoming Abu Dhabi talks that could be 'ambiguously perceived' on the frontlines to allow fighting to continue.<sup>[33][34]</sup> The counter-narrative cast the pause as a dangerous 'gesture of goodwill' comparable

to earlier pauses that produced 'tragic consequences' for Russia, including Ukraine's 2022 Kharkiv oblast gains following the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv.<sup>[35]</sup>

Several Russian military bloggers argued that only 'victories strengthen the negotiating position.'<sup>[36]</sup> They said that strikes intended for energy targets could be redirected towards Ukrainian logistics, including rail lines between Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia, to sustain military pressure and maintain a token 'truce' narrative.<sup>[37][38]</sup>

Regarding Ukraine's stability, Kremlin-aligned commentators described calculating mobilisation-age cohorts and monthly losses as a method to estimate when Ukraine's manpower pool would be exhausted.<sup>[39][40]</sup> They stated analysts should 'calculate the number of people...and divide that by the average monthly losses,' framing diplomacy as irrelevant so long as Ukrainian attrition rates continue and Russia is 'satisfied with the current state of affairs.'<sup>[41]</sup>

Mobilisation narratives amplified proposals by supposed Ukrainian military figures to force resident foreigners into six-month contracts, claiming up to '100,000 men of conscription age' were eligible.<sup>[42][43]</sup> This was framed as desperation, alongside claims of leadership 'personnel chaos,' selectively citing Western media coverage on Ukrainian corruption and governance strain.<sup>[44][45]</sup>

Internal stability discourse focused on energy collapse. Sources reported metro stoppages and outages across Kyiv, Kharkiv, and northern regions amid temperatures of 'up to -28°C.'<sup>[46][47]</sup> These disruptions were linked to stalled Western aid and corruption, with energy assistance 'stuck' in bureaucracy and protests becoming 'a regular societal response.'<sup>[48][49]</sup>




Figure 1. Kremlin-aligned source claims Kyiv plans forced mobilisation of foreigners, citing figures to signal Ukrainian desperation

## 2 | Russia and Ukraine

On the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad–Dobropillia axis **1**, Russian sources claimed an 'expanding control zone' after assault groups 'entered' Biletske and Novyi Donbas by 'about 1 km' and 'up to 1.5 km.'<sup>[50][51][52]</sup> Described as a 'grey zone,' this involved dispersed positions, small-group infiltration and Ukrainian counterattacks around Rodynske.<sup>[53][54][55]</sup> Russian control was cast as fluid, based on footholds near rail lines, treelines, and old mining infrastructure.<sup>[56]</sup>

Around Kostyantynivka **2**, Kremlin-aligned channels portrayed fighting as more than just a city battle, claiming advances from the Kleban-Byk reservoir into central neighbourhoods, including Shanghai and Hora, and clashes near the rail station.<sup>[57][58][59]</sup> They framed this as part of an operational 'arc' towards Kramatorsk–Sloviansk.<sup>[60][61]</sup>

Along the Lyman–Sloviansk axis **3**, reporting on Zakotne, Reznikivka, Nykyforivka, and Drobyshevo described 'closing the pocket' and the 'semi-encirclement' of Lyman.<sup>[62][63]</sup> Russian forces allegedly utilised infiltration via ravines and forest belts over full frontal assaults.<sup>[64][65]</sup> They also reported difficulties crossing the Siverskyi Donets river.<sup>[66][67]</sup>

On the Kharkiv–Kupiansk axis **4**, Russian sources described activity in Hrafske, Symynivka, and entry into Kutkivka, as pressure on Ukrainian logistics feeding Kupiansk and the Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi rail hub.<sup>[68][69][70]</sup> They also accused Ukraine of staged footage around Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi.<sup>[71][72]</sup>

More broadly, channels cited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as saying that attacks had shifted from energy infrastructure onto 'our logistics.'<sup>[73]</sup> They highlighted strikes on Synelnykove and Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways) suspensions between Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia, underpinned by extensive UAS attacks.<sup>[74][75][76][77]</sup>




Figure 2. Map showing Russian defence ministry, non-official Russian, and non-official Ukrainian claims of key (>five events) conflict-related incidents, such as missile strikes and front line activity, in Ukraine from 26 Jan 26 to 2 Feb 26

### 3 | Russian Activity in Eurasia

Russian source repeatedly presented **Moldova** as a pressure point that external actors could 'ignite' if Chisinau continues its westward course. Moldovan sources reported 'a large scale' Russian disinformation claim against the country to 'amplify public anxiety, undermine trust in state institutions and portray Moldova as 'unsafe.'<sup>[78][79]</sup>

Kremlin-aligned sources, meanwhile, framed a new US-supported 'smart' surveillance system on the Transnistria administrative line as evidence Chisinau is abandoning constitutional neutrality.<sup>[80]</sup> They also cast Ukrainian statements questioning the role of Russian 'peacekeepers' as provoking domestic debates over reintegration and security risk.<sup>[81][82]</sup> Others tied renewed Poland–Moldova defence cooperation to warnings of 'de facto NATO integration' and loss of sovereignty.<sup>[83][84][85]</sup>

In **Armenia**, supposedly leaked Kremlin documents described supposed Russian efforts to preserve a Kremlin-loyal social environment as formal leverage declines through diaspora engagement, 'apolitical' clubs, education initiatives, and church-linked activity.<sup>[86][87]</sup> This included claims that the Armenian Apostolic Church could serve as a mobilisation hub for pro-Russian groups ahead of the 2026 elections given local church–government frictions.<sup>[88][89]</sup>

**Azerbaijan** was discussed mainly through its energy posture and transport corridors, with Kremlin-aligned commentary criticising Baku's westward energy exports, including Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) flows to Europe, as eroding Moscow's regional leverage and shifting competition into the information space.<sup>[90][91]</sup> Discourse on the planned Zangezur transport corridor in Azerbaijan framed Western-backed infrastructure as strategic encroachment, undermining US mediation efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan.<sup>[92][93]</sup>





**Georgia** appeared primarily in relation to governance and external scrutiny, with pro-Kremlin narratives weaponising the OSCE's 'Moscow Mechanism' human rights investigations into policing and protest management to depict EU and UK involvement as foreign interference.<sup>[94]</sup> Moldova's president was cited as accusing Russia of using fear-of-war messaging to pull Georgia back into Moscow's orbit.<sup>[95]</sup>


In the **Baltic region**, Kremlin-aligned sources focused on enforcement efforts in the Baltic Sea, framing a 26 Jan 26 multinational statement on Russia's 'shadow fleet' as a 'Baltic blockade,' with some voices calling it a 'casus belli' and advocating Russian naval escorts linked along Kaliningrad supply routes.<sup>[96][97][98]</sup>




**Estonian** foreign minister Margus Tsahkna warned that the arrival of Russian combat veterans into the Schengen Area posed internal security risks for Europe, arguing such individuals might be leveraged by Russian special services and calling for banning the entry of Russians who fought in Ukraine into Schengen.<sup>[99]</sup> Kremlin-aligned channels rejected this framing, claiming Ukrainian veterans pose the real danger.<sup>[100]</sup>

**Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan** featured in reporting centred on formal security ties and economic dependence. Kremlin-aligned sources highlighted Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) deliveries to reinforce Tajik border security on the Afghan frontier, and framed Moscow as a regional security guarantor.<sup>[101]</sup> Other sources positioned regional labour migration and state economic exposure, including through reportedly throttled agricultural exports, as structural pressure points in relations with Russia.<sup>[102][103]</sup>

Published | 29/01/2026 12:32:03

 Estonia proposes banning entry to Schengen for all Russians who fought in Ukraine, - Tsakhkna  
 "Today, there are about a million, or at least hundreds of thousands of men who fought or continue to fight in Ukraine. What will happen if they want to enter the Schengen area?" - Politico quotes the diplomat. Estonia emphasizes that the return of such individuals to civilian life increases the risk of crime and their potential use by special services to destabilize societies in Europe. "Military personnel with combat experience, including individuals with anti-European views sent to the front from prisons, have no place in a free Europe," - said Margus Tsakhkna. @censor\_net| We are on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Tik-Tok, SL8


 ВеликийТокмакИнформ 

Tokmak


Community Forums, Chatrooms & Forums

Community Forum, Conflict, News, Military Analysis

Data Source Alignment  
Alignment Unspecified

Figure 3. Estonian official calls to bar Russian veterans from Schengen, framing them as threat to European security

# 4 | Assessment




Published | 29/01/2026 20:47:24

Russian forces tighten their grip on Krasny Liman — Readovka's final report for January 29 During their assault on Krasny Liman, Russian troops are methodically cutting off the Ukrainian garrison's escape routes, depriving them of the possibility of an organized retreat across the Severny Donets. Fighting has already begun on several fronts, from the forests south of Drobyshevo to the Dibrova area, making it virtually impossible to evacuate Ukrainian Armed Forces troops. At the same time, the area of attacks by our FPV drones against the enemy's rear logistics is expanding, reaching the outskirts of Pavlograd. In this context, there is talk in Kiev of "saving" UAV operators

IL RUSSO
Russia | General
Commentators or Influencers
Kremlin-aligned, Military Analysis, OSINT, Conflict, Disinformation, News
Data Source Alignment
Russian Federation | General

Figure 4. Russian commentator claims Russia is tightening Ukrainian encirclement near Lyman, emphasising attrition and 'saving' UAS operators'




Published | 29/01/2026 11:38:38

Attention! NATO air activity, a Boeing P-8A Poseidon long-range radar reconnaissance aircraft, and a Bombardier ARTEMIS II reconnaissance aircraft are conducting aggressive reconnaissance of Crimea and the Krasnodar Territory in the Black Sea near the Crimean Bridge. Sevastopol, western Crimea, Feodosia, the Crimean Bridge, and Novorossiysk are being given special attention. We expect provocations. Subscribe: TalipoV Online on Telegram TalipoV Online on MAX

Обсуждение
Crimean Peninsula | General
Chatrooms & Forums
Kremlin-aligned
Data Source Alignment
Russian Federation | General

Figure 5 (above). Kremlin-aligned channel frames NATO P-8A and bomber flights as 'provocations' near Crimea infrastructure

Figure 6 (right). Kremlin-aligned account claims advances near Dobropillya, framing Ukrainian counterattacks as costly and contained



Published | 31/01/2026 15:20:24

Successes near Dobropillya In the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya direction, our troops are actively advancing towards Belitskoye. Recently, assault aircraft successfully entered the village itself and consolidated their positions; they are now replenishing their positions with personnel and advancing deeper. And a few days ago, our advance group also managed to enter Novyi Donbas. Meanwhile, to the east, the front line has become clearer, with Novoye Shakhovo also under Russian Armed Forces control. The enemy is attempting to counterattack our positions along the Belitskoye-Rodinskoye line. Reinforcements from the 25th Airborne Assault Brigade with a large number of armored vehicles have arrived for this purpose. Yesterday, as a diversionary tactic, an attack was launched from Grishino, followed by an attempt to reach the southern outskirts of Rodinskoye. The attack was interrupted while still advancing, the equipment was destroyed, and the personnel were either eliminated or fled. The focus on the Rodynskoye-Sukhetske sector is no coincidence. Given the successes at Belitskoye, the Ukrainian Armed Forces could be at risk of being semi-encircled in a pocket west of Rodynskoye, forcing them to counterattack and stabilize the front. "Spetsnaz Archangel"

Сводки ополчения Новороссии З.О.В. (ДНР, ЛНР, Украина, Война)
Russia | General
Military Bloggers, Chatrooms & Forums
Milblogger, Military Analysis, Kremlin-aligned
Data Source Alignment
Russian Federation | General

It is highly likely that the Russian information ecosystem will continue shifting its core framing from 'NATO is hostile' to 'NATO has a rehearsed pipeline for immediate warfighting' over the next 30 days (until 2 Mar 26), emphasising exercises, force-movement corridors, and logistics integration. This framing is likely intended to resonate with domestic audiences and justify Russian defensive measures.

Likewise, it is likely that the dominant official Russian narrative on negotiations is designed to pre-empt accusations of intransigence, portraying Moscow as negotiating in good faith while defining any unacceptable outcome as Western obstruction rather than Russian refusal.

Despite the reported 'energy truce' it is highly likely that Kremlin-aligned commentators do not envisage a pause in fighting and would interpret the absence of tangible battlefield outcomes, such as frontline gains or degradation of Ukrainian logistics, as a missed opportunity or a failure of military planning.

It is highly likely that Russian mobilisation narratives claiming that Ukraine plans to force resident foreign nationals into six-month contracts are designed to stoke fear in the Ukrainian population, signal desperation, and reinforce perceptions of Ukrainian military collapse.

It is likely that Kremlin-aligned messaging will continue reframing Baltic security measures, such as maritime enforcement and initiatives targeting Russian war veterans, as hybrid aggression to legitimise escalation rhetoric on the Baltic Sea.

ExTrac assessments are derived from hand-curated data feeds and provide official and population-level perspectives on geopolitical developments. They should not be read as all-source assessments, but they do describe our assessed likelihood based on the data listed in the Methodology.

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72. Russian Federation | General. Rybar in English. Telegram. 31 Jan 26 15:31:05. [Link to Post](#)
73. Russian Federation | General. ⚓ РУССКАЯ ОДЕССА ⚓24/7 Чат 🇷🇺 🌐. Telegram. 30 Jan 26 15:45:24. [Link to Post](#)
74. Russian Federation | General. «Лисичанск - колыбель Донбасса». Telegram. 30 Jan 26 12:56:30. [Link to Post](#)
75. Russian Federation | General. Military Wave. Telegram. 27 Jan 26 11:01:01. [Link to Post](#)
76. Russian Federation | General. Russia News 🇷🇺. Telegram. 30 Jan 26 18:00:25. [Link to Post](#)
77. Russian Federation | General. Military Wave. Telegram. 26 Jan 26 11:04:01. [Link to Post](#)
78. Alignment Unspecified. moldovalive.md. undefined. 30 Jan 26 08:51:48. [Link to Post](#)
79. Alignment Unspecified. Telex.md. Telegram. 30 Jan 26 08:30:00. [Link to Post](#)
80. Russian Federation | General. 🗣️ ЧАТ 😊 Tricolorthednestr🇷🇺. Telegram. 31 Jan 26 17:20:43. [Link to Post](#)
81. Russian Federation | General. Two Majors - English Channel. Telegram. 31 Jan 26 09:27:58. [Link to Post](#)
82. Russian Federation | General. PolitHub. Telegram. 29 Jan 26 16:22:23. [Link to Post](#)
83. Russian Federation | General. WTF?! Комментарии. Telegram. 30 Jan 26 14:41:36. [Link to Post](#)
84. Russian Federation | General. Флуераш. Telegram. 02 Feb 26 08:24:01. [Link to Post](#)
85. Russian Federation | General. Молдоване. Telegram. 02 Feb 26 08:25:27. [Link to Post](#)
86. Alignment Unspecified. Сияющая звезда. Telegram. 01 Feb 26 20:53:48. [Link to Post](#)
87. Alignment Unspecified. 🇷🇺 Masis Vanguard 🇷🇺. Telegram. 30 Jan 26 12:16:24. [Link to Post](#)
88. Republic of Armenia | General. aniboghoss. X. 29 Jan 26 07:38:57. [Link to Post](#)
89. Russian Federation | General. КАВКАЗАРЬ. Telegram. 31 Jan 26 15:24:13. [Link to Post](#)
90. Russian Federation | General. Ukraine Watch. Telegram. 31 Jan 26 16:07:26. [Link to Post](#)
91. Republic of Azerbaijan. AZfront. Telegram. 30 Jan 26 20:15:57. [Link to Post](#)
92. Alignment Unspecified. UDudaka. Telegram. 28 Jan 26 11:31:12. [Link to Post](#)
93. Russian Federation | General. #СамыйЛучшийЧат. Telegram. 29 Jan 26 11:50:06. [Link to Post](#)
94. Russian Federation | General. КАВКАЗАРЬ. Telegram. 30 Jan 26 09:05:00. [Link to Post](#)
95. Russian Federation | General. GЕнацвале чат. Telegram. 27 Jan 26 14:40:06. [Link to Post](#)
96. Russian Federation | General. InfoDefBulgariaChat. Telegram. 28 Jan 26 12:39:00. [Link to Post](#)
97. Russian Federation | General. WTF?! Комментарии. Telegram. 31 Jan 26 06:22:40. [Link to Post](#)
98. Russian Federation | General. Sputnik Литва | Новости Чат. Telegram. 27 Jan 26 10:28:38. [Link to Post](#)
99. Alignment Unspecified. 🇷🇺 ВеликийТокмакИнформ 🇷🇺. Telegram. 29 Jan 26 12:32:03. [Link to Post](#)
100. Russian Federation | General. UKR LEAKS eng Chat. Telegram. 30 Jan 26 13:24:01. [Link to Post](#)
101. Russian Federation | General. ТУРАНАРЬ. Telegram. 31 Jan 26 17:40:23. [Link to Post](#)
102. Russian Federation | General. Осташко! Важное(чат). Telegram. 01 Feb 26 17:54:46. [Link to Post](#)
103. Russian Federation | General. sharp333. Telegram. 28 Jan 26 05:28:47. [Link to Post](#)

# Methodology

**Report purpose.** This report analyses pro-Russian perspectives and sentiment towards NATO, the 'special military operation' in Ukraine and Russian activity in Eurasia. It considers the perspectives of Russian officials, population-level commentators and influencers, and non-Russians who align with the Kremlin narrative.

**Data.** Analysis in this report is based on data collected from 1001Z 26 Jan 26 to 1000Z 2 Feb 26 using communications sources on Telegram, X, VK, and Facebook feeds. Over 5,290,890 data points were reviewed.

ExTrac collects and translates open-source communications data in real time from high-relevance, hard-to-reach, and hard-to-find sources, channels, and chatrooms associated with state and non-state actors. Our automated collectors strip all communications of sensitive metadata and Personal Data/Personal Identifiable Information (PII) and render them accessible, in real-time, in ExTrac's data lake.

Once ingested, all data streams are processed, enriched, and made available for analysis using ExTrac's AI-powered influence and kinetic activity trackers (figure A).

We interrogate these data using a range of proprietary, machine- and AI-enabled analytics tools.

**Assessments.** ExTrac assessments are derived from hand-curated data feeds and provide official and population-level perspectives on geopolitical developments. They should not be read as all-source assessments, but they do describe our assessed likelihood based on the data listed in the Methodology and using the Probability Yardstick (figure B) as released by the UK's Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis.



Figure A. Screenshot of communications feeds from the ExTrac platform





Figure B. UK's Probability Yardstick



High-relevance, hard-to-reach data, compliant and made sense of at scale

We are a British OSINT company offering both an AI SaaS platform and bespoke customer information reporting on an IaaS basis.

ExTrac finds, curates, and ingests the highest relevance and hardest-to-reach adversary data sources across the surface, deep, and dark web.

It captures the communications and kinetic behaviours of hostile state and non-state actors and mines them for real-time insights on conflict, greyzone, and influence activities using AI that's both secure and compliant by design.

For more information please contact us at [info@extrac.ai](mailto:info@extrac.ai)

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